Using unusually rich and accurate data from Oslo Stock Exchange firms, we find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, that insider ownership matters the most, that outside ownership concentration destroys market value, that direct ownership is superior to intermediaries like institutions and the state, and that performance decreases with increasing board size, leverage, dividend payout and the fraction of nonvoting shares. These results persist across a wide range of single equation models, suggesting that governance mechanisms are independent and may be studied one by one rather than as a bundle. We cannot generalize these findings based on Tobin's Q to other performance measures. Although several significant relationships change sign or disappear in simultaneous equations models, this apparent indication of optimal, firm specific governance systems may instead reflect weak instruments caused by too partial theories of how governance and performance interact.
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The key question in finance-based corporate governance research is whether economic values are driven by governance mechanisms, such as the legal protection of capitalists, the firm's competitive environment, ownership structure, board composition, and financial policy. Research on the interaction between governance and performance interaction has been rather limited, however, and the empirical evidence is mixed and inconclusive. This is both because corporate governance is a novel academic field and because high-quality data are hard to obtain. Not surprisingly, therefore, we cannot yet specify the best governance system, neither in a normative nor a positive sense.
Our paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the interaction between governance and performance in four different ways. Unlike most existing research, which studies just one or two ownership characteristics, we include a wider set of mechanisms, such as the identity of outside owners (e.g, institutional, international, and personal), the use of voting and nonvoting shares, board size, and dividend policy. This approach brings us closer to capturing the full picture and also allows us to empirically explore the validity of more partial analyses which have so far been used (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985) ; Morck et al. (1988) ; McConnell and Servaes (1990); Gugler (2001) ) and which must also be used in the future due to limited data availability in most countries.
The second contribution concerns endogeneity and causality, which is under-explored both theoretically and empirically. Endogeneity occurs when mechanisms are internally related, like when agency theory argues that large outside owners and high insider stakes are alternative disciplining tools. By reverse causation we mean that performance may drive governance, like when privately informed insiders ask for stock bonus plans. Our simultaneous system approach, which has the potential of capturing both endogeneity and reverse causation, has only recently been used in this setting (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2002; Bhagat and Jefferis, 2002) . The findings using this approach, which Becht et al. (2002) call "third generation" studies due to what they consider "vastly improved econometrics," differ markedly from studies using single equation methods (first and second generation approaches). In particular, the significant relationships between governance and performance found using single equation models mostly disappear in third generation approaches. We explore whether such results are due to the nature of the corporate governance problem or to the difficulty of using simultaneous systems when the theory to be tested cannot specify how governance mechanisms interact.
Third, we help clarifying how the existing evidence depends on its context. For instance, most extant research deals with large US firms operating in a common law regime with an active market for corporate control, where outside ownership concentration is very low, 1 where
1 The typical holding of the largest owner in a listed firm in the mid-1990s was 3% in the US, 14% in the 2 strong incentive contracts for management is the rule, and where inside directors are common. In contrast, our Norwegian sample firms are on average much smaller, the legal regime belongs to the Scandinavian version of civil law, hostile takeovers are practically nonexistent, firms are more closely held, performance related pay is less common, and corporate boards have never more than one inside director, who is never the chairman. According to principal agent theory, all these governance mechanisms matter for economic performance. By testing the theory's predictions on firms with quite different mechanism profiles, we can better judge the general validity of the agency approach to corporate governance. Fourth, our ownership structure data may produce more reliable evidence than earlier studies. Anderson and Lee (1997) , who replicate three US studies using four alternative data sources for the same data type, find that data quality distorts conclusions, and that poor data quality reduces the power of tests. The extant analyses of ownership structure in the US, Japan, the UK, and continental Europe are based on large holdings (blocks), only, as there is no legal obligation to report other stakes (Barca and Becht, 2001 ). This means that holdings below a minimum reporting threshold of 2-5% (depending on the country) cannot be observed, typically implying that the owners of roughly one third to one half of outstanding equity is ignored. As changes in large holdings are only registered at certain discrete thresholds (such as 5%, 10%, 20% and 50% of outstanding equity), any stake between these discrete points is estimated with error, and every stake above the highest reporting threshold is underestimated. Also, except for the UK and the US, the available international evidence refers to just one or two years in the mid 1990s. In contrast, our data includes every stake in all firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange over the period [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] . It involves a relatively long time series and suffers neither from the large holdings bias nor the discrete thresholds problem.
Unlike most existing research, we find a negative and very significant relationship between outside ownership concentration and economic performance as measured by Tobin's Q. Insider holdings are value creating up to roughly 60%, which is far above the insider fraction in most of our sample firms. Individual (personal) owners are associated with higher performance than multiple agent relationships through private or state intermediaries, small boards create more value than large, and firms which issue shares with unequal voting rights lose market value. Although these findings are generally consistent with agency theory, the outside concentration result suggests that the benefit of external monitoring is dominated by the cost, such as reduced liquidity, insufficient diversification, and excessive monitoring. We also do not find that debt financing and dividend payments are used as disciplining de-UK, 45% in continental Europe (Barca and Becht, 2001) , and 30% in Norway (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001) .
vices. The fact that practically every result survives across a wide range of single equation regression models makes us conclude that governance mechanisms are rarely substitutes or complements, and that using a comprehensive set of governance mechanisms simultaneously is unnecessary for capturing the relevance of any single mechanism for performance. However, most of the relationships are reversed or disappear if we instead use a simultaneous equations approach. We suspect this is because no existing governance theory can yet properly restrict the simultaneous system. Until the theory of corporate governance can handle not just each mechanism separately but also their endogenous nature, so called third generation models may even be inferior to single equation models in terms of providing deeper insight into the relationship between governance and performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Existing research is discussed in section 1, and section 2 presents descriptive statistics of our governance and performance data. Section 3 analyzes the interaction between governance and performance in a single equation setting, whereas section 4 uses a simultaneous equations framework. The paper is concluded in section 5.
Theoretical framework and existing evidence
Corporate governance mechanisms are vehicles for reducing agency costs, i.e., tools for minimizing the destruction of market value caused by conflicts of interest between the firm's stakeholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Vives, 2000; Tirole, 2001; Becht et al., 2002) . This paper focuses on the principal-agent problem between managers and owners and between subgroups of owners. We start by briefly outlining the major ideas behind the mechanisms we will be analyzing empirically, which are the firm's competitive environment, the large outside owners, the identity of outside owners, inside owners, board composition, security design, and financial policy.
Theoretical predictions
When products, labor, and takeover markets are fully competitive, self-serving managers will maximize their welfare by maximizing stockholders' equity value (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1985; Stulz, 1988) . Outside such a world, market discipline alone is insufficient, and other governance mechanisms must be called upon to reduce agency costs. The agency problem may still be optimally solved with complete contracts. Since such contracts cannot be written in practice without excessive costs (Hart, 1995; Vives, 2000) , our theoretical framework assumes both imperfect markets and incomplete contracts.
The expected effect of ownership concentration on performance is unclear, as it reflects the net impact of benefits and costs which are difficult to rank a priori. The benefits are the principal's monitoring of its agents (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) , higher takeover premia (Burkart, 1995) , and less free-riding by small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . The costs are reduced market liquidity (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia et al., 2001) , lower diversification benefits (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) , increased majority-minority conflicts (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000) , and reduced management initiative (Burkhart et al., 1997) . Finally, the hypothesized benefits of monitoring rest on the implicit assumption that owners are competent.
3 Since we cannot a priori specify the relative importance of these costs and benefits, the shape of the relation between concentration and performance can only be determined empirically. Agency theory argues that owner type matters. In particular, direct principal-agent relationships represented by personal investors is thought to be better than indirect ownership, where widely held private corporations or the state invest on others' behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Pound (1988) , however, argues that institutional owners may be as good as or even better than, personal owners, provided their lower monitoring costs are not offset by the negative incentive effect of delegated monitoring. The net impact of replacing personal investors by institutions is therefore unclear. Furthermore, since international (foreign) investors may be at an informational disadvantage, they bias their portfolio toward domestic firms and invest abroad only to capture diversification benefits rather than to improve governance (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Brennan and Cao, 1997; de Santis and Gerard, 1997) . Like for state vs. private and non-personal vs. personal investors, we would therefore expect that because increased holdings by international investors reduces monitoring, firm performance is negatively affected.
Whereas the primary governance function of outside owners is monitoring of the management team, a larger insider stake reduces the need for such monitoring. The convergence-ofinterest hypothesis predicts that insider holdings and economic performance are positively related. Morck et al. (1988) argue that powerful insiders may entrench themselves and expropriate wealth from outside owners. Also, because there are other sources of insider power than insider ownership, such as tenure and charisma, one cannot predict the insider stake at which diminishing returns sets in. Finally, as insiders carry a larger fraction of the destructed market value the higher their stake, the negative performance effect of entrenchment may disappear or turn positive as the insider stake becomes sufficiently large. Consequently, the shape of the relation between insider ownership and performance cannot be specified unless we put a priori restrictions on the underlying costs and benefits.
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The board of directors is another governance mechanism. Because groups communicate less effectively beyond a certain size, there is pressure from self serving managers or entrenched owners to expand board size beyond its value-maximizing level (Jensen, 1993) , causing an inverse relationship between board size and performance. Moving on to classic corporate finance mechanisms, security design is another candidate. Because nonvoting shares represent a deviation from one share -one vote, the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights means that dual class shares may create a conflict between owners resembling the one between majority and minority voting stockholders. Therefore, most theories of price differences between voting and nonvoting shares assume a potential extraction of private benefits by the voting shareholders. We expect firms to be less valuable the higher the fraction of nonvoting shares outstanding (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988) .
Financing policy can be used to limit management discretion over free cash flow by financing with debt rather than equity and paying out earnings as dividends or stock repurchase (Jensen, 1986) . Also, higher payout force the firm more frequently to the new issue market, exposing it to more intense monitoring (Easterbrook, 1984) . Consequently, owners can create more value through high leverage and high payout.
The equilibrium hypothesis brings all the mechanisms together by stating that if optimally installed, every mechanism satisfies a zero marginal value condition. A small change in any mechanism leaves firm value practically unaltered, such that corporate governance and firm performance are unrelated (Demsetz, 1983) . This is far from saying that governance is irrelevant for performance. Since two firms may have widely different sets of optimal mechanisms, the equilibrium condition implies that in a cross-sectional regression of performance on governance, no mechanism will be significantly related to performance if the observed governance systems are optimal. Conversely, a significant relationship reflects a disequilibrium and a source of improved performance.
Finally, because firm value is created by more than corporate governance mechanisms, a governance-performance prediction should include exogenous variables that either influence the optimal governance mix or affect performance without influencing governance. Such controls can also be used to get rid of spurious correlation, which occurs when what seems like a relationship between governance and performance is driven by a third, omitted variable, such as firm size or risk.
Empirics
Our paper compares the performance of firms with different governance mechanisms in place. The analytical tool used by existing research in this field is regressions, the sample is a crosssection, the vast majority of papers analyze one or a few ownership characteristics, and most often outside concentration. Among the 33 empirical ownership performance papers from 1932 through 1998 surveyed by Gugler (2001) , 27 deal with concentration and 6 with insiders. The papers mostly find either a positive or no link between concentration and performance, 5 whereas four of the six insider papers (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Belkaoui and Pavlik, 1992; Holderness et al., 1999 ) find a non-monotone relationship between insider holdings and firm performance. 6 The two other studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Cho, 1998) , which both use simultaneous equations, cannot detect a significant link. The evidence on the role of owner identity is limited and mixed. For instance, some find a positive performance effect of family control (Jacquemin and de Ghellinck, 1980; Mishra et al., 2000) , of founder-insiders in young firms (Morck et al., 1988) , of private ownership (Boardman and Vining, 1989) and of institutional investors (McConnell and Servaes, 1990) . Others cannot detect any pattern, like Kole and Mulherin (1997) for state owners and Smith (1996) for institutional shareholder activism. According to Gugler (2001) , the relationship between owner identity and economic performance is remarkably unexplored.
Security design, financial policy, and market competition are the mechanisms which have been studied the least. The governance effect of product market competition is analyzed by Palmer (1973) and Crespi et al. (2002) , and the findings are consistent with the notion that competition is a disciplining device, and that owner monitoring and product market competition are substitute mechanisms. We are unaware of any paper on security design and economic performance in a corporate governance setting. Except for Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , who model the debt to equity ratio as one of seven governance mechanisms, existing research only includes financial policy as a control variable reflecting governance-independent determinants of performance, such as the interest tax shield (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Cho, 1998) . Finally, although research on board characteristics and economic performance has produced mixed results (Bhagat and Black, 1998; Becht et al., 2002) , the finding that performance decreases with increasing board size is quite robust, suggesting that boards are on average too large.
Three problems in governance -performance research
This research tradition has three characteristics which all question the quality of the current empirical insight. We call them the partial theories, the sample bias, and the simultaneous equation problems.
The partial theories problem. Corporate governance theory very often deals with univariate rather than multivariate relationships, which means predictions are for one mechanism, only. For instance, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) model the performance effect of ownership concentration, whereas Morck et al. (1988) and Stulz (1988) focus on insider ownership.
7 Tests of such predictions may not capture the impact of a given mechanism unless one properly controls for the others, which are not even specified by the theory in question. Because mechanisms are mostly assumed to be exogenous, this is problematic if real world mechanisms are substitute or complementary ways of reducing agency costs. For instance, although McConnell and Servaes (1990) consider both ownership concentration, insider holdings, and institutional ownership, they present no theory of interrelations and use a multivariate approach which cannot capture mechanism endogeneity. The only paper we know which establishes a system of endogenous, multiple governance mechanisms is Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , who argue theoretically (although rather incompletely) why the mechanisms are modeled as functions of each other and of exogenous variables.
The final partiality problem concerns the order of causation between mechanisms and performance, where governance theory argues that the former causes the latter. Since causation may run either way, however, the relationship should be modeled accordingly. Although this issue has been raised earlier (see e.g. McConnell and Servaes (1990) ), it has only recently been analyzed empirically (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Loderer and Martin, 1997; Cho, 1998; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2002) . The only paper which addresses this issue both theoretically and empirically is Cho (1998).
The sample bias problem. The data used in the empirical tests are dominated by US firms, 8 the firms are very large, 9 the ownership structure variables only reflect block-holders,
10
insider holdings are often biased toward board members, 11 the set of owner types is quite narrow, 12 and most of the evidence is based on just one year.
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This sample bias creates several generalization problems. If the regulatory environment drives the governance mechanisms, the US evidence may be insufficient to judge the general validity of the theory. The over-representation of large firms is problematic if the link between governance and performance depends on firm size. The focus on block-holdings is not dictated by theory, but by an arbitrary cutoff point for mandatory reporting. If the ratio of board to non-board insider holdings differs systematically across firms, the focus on board members rather than all insiders or other insider subgroups (such as the management team) may fail to detect the true relationship between insider ownership and performance.
Since theory argues that different owner types have different roles to play when ownership is separated from control, a data set with a richer classification of types has a better chance of capturing the relevance of owner identity for economic performance. Finally, the snapshot approach, which is due to limited data availability, cannot tell whether relationships between governance and performance persist over time, or are due to the specific period chosen.
The simultaneous equation problem. Table 1 classifies the methodologies used in existing empirical research. Almost without exception, the papers belong in cell 1, where the econometric approach takes the mechanisms as externally given, causation is supposed to run from governance to performance, and where the single-equation regression typically contains one or two mechanisms. A sophisticated example is McConnell and Servaes (1990) , who estimate the dependence of Tobin's Q on ownership concentration, insider ownership, and institutional holdings, using leverage, growth potential, and firm size as controls.
[ Table 1 about here.] 8 Among the 28 studies of concentration and performance surveyed by Gugler (2001) , 18 use US data, 5 are British, 2 are from Germany, and the remaining 3 use data from respectively Australia, France, and Japan. The 6 insider papers are all from the US.
9 Morck et al. (1988) , Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998) , who are among the most sophisticated and influential papers, all sample from the Fortune 500 list, studying 371 such firms from 1980, 383 firms from 1987 and 326 firms from 1991, respectively. McConnell and Servaes (1990) are less restrictive, as they randomly sample NYSE and Amex firms, using 1.173 firms from 1976 and 1.093 firms from 1986.
10 Ownership concentration per firm is based on the aggregate fraction across all reported blocks, i.e., stakes above a certain limit (normally 5%).
11 As the most common proxy is the aggregate director stake, ownership by non-board insiders like nondirector officers is ignored.
12 Most studies ignore identity altogether, and the others use two categories, only, such as institutional vs. non-institutional, state vs. private, and personal vs. non-personal.
13 McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Holderness et al. (1999) are exceptions, since they sample from two different years and test the predictions on both sets.
A study which comes close to cell 2 is Himmelberg et al. (1999) . Although analyzing one-way causation running from insider ownership to performance, only, they argue that these stakes depend on the contracting environment and estimate insider ownership from firm characteristics. However, mechanism interaction is not modeled. Cell 3 is unfeasible, as one cannot model two-way causation without letting at least one mechanism be endogenously related to performance.
Starting with a cell 1 approach and then moving to cell 4 by estimating the governance mechanisms and performance as a system of simultaneous equations, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998) find that most of the significant results disappear. This evidence brings the authors close to concluding that the equilibrium condition prevails. For instance, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find that if each of their seven governance mechanisms are considered exogenous and related to Q one by one, four of them are significant (insider holdings, board independence, leverage, and corporate control activity). Keeping the exogeneity assumption, but allowing for all the exogenous mechanisms in one multivariate regression, insider holdings are no longer significant. Finally, when allowing for two-way causality, the only significant mechanism in their simultaneous system is board independence. Whereas Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) do not report their findings on causation, Cho (1998) concludes that causation is reversed, running from performance to insider holdings (which is his only governance variable) rather than the opposite way.
The a priori possibility of mechanism endogeneity and reverse causation favors cell 4 methodologies. However, successful implementation of these methods depends on whether corporate governance theory can offer well-founded restrictions on the equation system. Such a theory does not yet exist. The theoretical literature neither addresses how a wide set of mechanisms interact, nor what exogenous (i.e., non-governance) variables are driving twoway causation, nor the nature of the equilibrium in terms of an optimal combination of governance mechanisms for a given set of exogenous variables. Since the findings of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Cho (1998) strongly depend on whether cell 1 or cell 4 approaches are used, a key unresolved issue is whether cell 4 methodologies provide reliable evidence on the interaction between governance and performance.
Descriptive statistics
Our sample is all firms except financials listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) during the period 1989 to 1997. The OSE is medium sized by European standards, plays a modest but increasingly important role in the national economy, and became considerably more liquid over the sample period.
14 Although Norway has a civil law regime, the protection of shareholder rights still seems better than in many common law countries (La Porta et al., 2000; Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001 ). This may be one reason why OSE firms have less concentrated ownership than any other European country except the UK (Barca and Becht, 2001; Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2001 ).
15 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for governance mechanisms, controls, and performance measures for our sample of firms. The most common concentration measures in the literature are the Herfindahl index 16 and the fraction of outstanding equity owned by the n'th or the n largest shareholders, n mostly varying between 1 and 5. The table reports the Herfindahl index and large owner fractions for n up to 20, the number of owners, the median and mean fraction, and the stake of the largest outside (i.e., non-insider) owner. On average, the median owner is minuscule, the largest holds 29%, the two largest are a blocking minority against charter amendments, the four largest produce a simple majority, and a coalition of the ten largest form a supermajority. 17 The largest outside owner holds 26% on average.
[ Table 2 about here.]
We classify investors into five types: state, individuals (persons), financials (institutions), nonfinancials, and international. To capture a case of pure indirect holdings in firms with many owners, we additionally consider intercorporate ownership between OSE firms. The equally weighted averages show that national corporations is the largest type and also the most frequent largest owner. However, value weighted averages not shown in the table reveal that international investors hold the largest and personal investors the smallest fraction of the market portfolio.
18 Due to the overlap between directors (8%) and officers (4%), who together constitute the insiders, the average insider fraction (officers and directors) is 8%.
Since the CEO is the only director of OSE firms, these figures reflect that director holdings are mostly CEO holdings. Norwegian boards are outsider dominated and small by international standards. The average number of directors is 7, and 75% of the boards have 8 members or less. Nonvoting shares are issued by 14% of the firms, international investors hold 54% of these shares and are heavily over-represented both before and after 1995, when a cap on international holdings of voting shares was lifted.
19 The average debt to total assets is 57%, dividends are 27% of earnings for all firms and 52% for the dividend payers, which is half the firms. Regulation made stock repurchases practically nonexistent in the sample period. Our controls are investments (measured as accounting investments over sales), stock volatility, stock liquidity (annual turnover), stock beta, and equity size (the log of market value of equity). Asset pricing theory predicts that equity value is negatively related to beta and positively to liquidity. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the value of owner monitoring increases with increasing uncertainty in the firm's environment, making concentration and volatility positively related. Investments are supposed to control for noise in accounting based performance measures (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) , and equity value is used to capture the association between size and performance (Hawawini and Keim, 2000) . The average value of our sample firms in 1997 is roughly one fifth the average NYSE firm and twice the average NASDAQ firm.
The performance proxies used in the literature are Tobin's Q, the accounting rate of return on assets (RoA), and the market return on the stock (RoS). Because we miss data on replacement values, Q is operationalized as the market value to book value of assets. The mean (median) estimate is 1.5 (1.2) for Q, 5.0% (7.3%) for RoA, and 33.1% (13.0%) for RoS.
3 Single equation estimates
This section tests and compares a wide range of models which all belong in cell 1 of table 1. We start with the very simplest univariate approach, switch to the opposite extreme of a full multivariate model, and finally compare both approaches to the findings from several partial multivariate models. Table 3 summarizes the findings of univariate regressions under five alternative performance measures. For each model, where we regress a performance measure on either a governance mechanism or a control, the table shows the sign and the significance level of the coefficient estimate. We use both annual values and five year averages for returns, and we measure concentration by both single investor stakes (e.g., fraction held by largest owner), aggregate stakes (e.g., fraction held by five largest), and a proxy which reflects the entire ownership structure (the Herfindahl index).
Univariate analysis

21
[ Two distinct patterns in the table suggest that the choice of performance measure matters. First, the strength of a relationship differs across performance measures. For instance, although the stake of the five largest owners varies inversely with every performance proxy, the relationship is insignificant for RoA and RoS, significant at the 2.5% level for RoS 5 , and significant at the 1% level for RoA 5 and Q. The covariation between a performance measure and an independent variable is more often significant with Q, more often with the five year averages RoA 5 and RoS 5 than with their annual counterparts, and, for a given averaging period, more often when performance reflects total assets than equity.
Second, consistency across performance measures is higher with five year averages than annual returns. This is particularly true for Q and RoA 5 , which both measure value creation for the firm as a whole. For instance, the holding of either one of the three insider categories is never significantly related to RoA, and the estimated sign is the opposite of what we find using Q for two of the three. In contrast, RoA 5 and Q produce the same estimated sign for every insider category, and both suggest that directors and directors+officers are significant at the 1% level.
Although both Q and RoA 5 produce the cleanest relationships, we use Q as our base case in the following. Since it is the most commonly used measure in the recent literature, using Q facilitates the comparison with previous results. Because RoA 5 is constructed from overlapping observations, error terms in pooled panel -time series regressions may be autocorrelated. Also, since RoA 5 is purely accounting based, it may be far from market returns and biased by earnings management.
Focusing on Q and using a 1% significance level, the univariate models in table 3 show that ownership concentration is inversely related to performance when concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index, the largest stake, and by alliances of large owners, such as the three 21 We do not report the R 2 values, which all vary between 0 and 4%.
13
or five largest as a group rather than the third or fifth largest alone. The covariation with performance is positive for individual investors and negative for the state and nonfinancials, regardless of whether we measure owner identity by aggregate holdings per type or type of the largest owner. Directors and insiders as a group both have large stakes when performance is high, and performance is lower for firms which finance with debt.
The full multivariate model
Based on the theory and evidence discussed in section 1, we specify a full multivariate model relating Q to ownership concentration, insider holdings, owner type, board characteristics, security design, financial policy, and controls. The estimates are presented in table 4, which also reports the mean sample values of the dependent and independent variables. It turns out that the results are insensitive to whether we measure concentration by the holdings of the largest owner, the two largest, three largest, four largest, five largest or by the Herfindahl index. Since the latter also captures size heterogeneity across the largest holdings, we measure concentration by the Herfindahl index from now on. Also, since our results are not sensitive to whether we proxy for owner identity by aggregate holding per type or by the identity of the largest owner, we use aggregate holding per type to measure owner identity. Because the five aggregate fractions sum to unity per firm by construction, we avoid econometric problems by excluding one type and interpreting this type as the reference case. We arbitrarily choose financial owners as the reference.
[ Table 4 about here.]
The following findings are significant at the 3% level or less:
1. Ownership concentration and economic performance are inversely related.
2. Performance increases with insider ownership up to roughly 60% and then decreases.
3. Individual owners are associated with higher performance than other outside owners.
4. Performance is inversely related to board size, the fraction of nonvoting shares outstanding, and to financial leverage.
5. Performance varies systematically with industry membership and firm size.
The finding that performance and concentration are inversely related means that the costs of large owners (reduced market liquidity, lower diversification benefits, increased majority -minority conflicts, reduced management initiative) dominate the benefits (valuable monitoring, higher takeover premia, and less free-riding). It supports the idea that outside monitoring by powerful owners either does not occur or does not benefit all owners if carried out. If the primary function of the owner is to hold on to a big stake, the typical firm would do better with small owners who vote with their feet. This finding differs from the mostly positive or neutral effects reported in the literature, but is consistent with recent evidence by Lehmann and Weigand (2000) of a negative relation between ownership concentration and RoA for 361 public and private German firms in 1991-1996.
The second result demonstrates that although concentration in general destroys value, it may be driven by unique costs of outside as opposed to inside concentration. It highlights the importance of using inside incentives instead of outside control, supports the notion that minority shareholder protection is value creating, and is consistent with most earlier findings. The maximum of the insider -performance relation occurs around 60%, the average insider fraction in the sample is 8%, and only 3% of the firms have insider holdings above 60%. This means many sample firms are on the steep, increasing part of the curve, and almost all of them are on the increasing part. Thus, although there are universally decreasing returns to insider holdings, the marginal return is almost always positive in our sample of firms.
The third finding, that individual owners are superior, supports the hypothesis that outside owner identity matters and that multiple agent relationships are value destroying. Thus, although performance is inversely related to outside concentration in general, the negative effect is less pronounced when the large ownership is direct rather than indirect.
The negative link between board size and performance is consistent with the idea that small groups communicate better than large, and that the efficiency loss sets in at a rather small group size. It fits well with empirical findings in other countries. The security design hypothesis that nonvoting equity enables voting shareholders to extract wealth from others may explain our finding that the higher the fraction of such shares outstanding, the lower the performance. The inverse interaction between leverage and performance does not support the agency argument that debt disciplines management. If instead leverage is supposed to control for the value of the interest tax shield, the finding cannot be rationalized by such a theory either.
The significant industry effects are difficult to interpret because we do not know whether our rather crude competition proxy is better described as a governance mechanism (market competition) or a governance independent industry effect. Anyway, the evidence does reflect some source of industry-wide performance differences which are not picked up by other variables in the regressions, and which would otherwise have ended up in the error term. The very consistent, positive association between firm size and performance reflects a governance independent source of value creation, possibly due to market power and economies of scale and scope. Finally, since several mechanisms in the table covary significantly with economic performance, the full multivariate model rejects the equilibrium hypothesis. Performance is inferior because most firms have a suboptimal combination of governance mechanisms.
Performance sensitivity in the full multivariate model Even if two governance mechanisms have coefficients which both differ significantly from zero, their importance for performance may still be widely different. We quantify this performance sensitivity by the impact on Q of a modified mechanism, discussing only relationships which are significant at the 5% level, and treating industry membership as a control rather than as a governance mechanism. Leverage is ignored because the significant, negative sign is inconsistent with both governance and tax shield explanations. This leaves us with ownership concentration, insider holdings, individual investors, board size, and security design. Table 4 shows directly that Q decreases by 0.63 units when concentration increases with one unit, and that performance sensitivity is roughly twice as large to aggregate individual holdings (1.04) and to voting shares (1.19). These effects may also be expressed as valuation effects for the average firm. Due to the two nonlinear terms, we cannot estimate such effects by simply plugging the mean values of every independent variable into the regression. Rather, we must insert the square of the mean insider stake and the log of average board size. Similarly, the estimated Q for the average firm is not the average Q (1.520), but the Q of a firm where every governance and control variable equals the sample mean (1.558).
Suppose the largest owner initially holds 28% of the equity in a firm with Q equal to 1.558. If the stake is reduced by ten percentage points to 18%, our model predicts that Q will increase from 1.558 to 1.620. This means the market value of the firm grows by 0.4% for every percentage point reduced concentration. Since average firm value is NOK 2 billion, 0.4% corresponds to a value growth of NOK 8 million. The valuation effect would be roughly doubled if either aggregate individual holdings or the fraction of voting shares increased by one percentage point.
Since Q is quadratic in insider holdings, we must consider both the positive linear term and the negative quadratic term, and the sensitivity of Q will depend on the level of insider holdings. If we again consider a firm where all the independent variables entering linearly are at the sample average, insiders own 8% of the firm's equity. If this stake is increased to 9%, Q grows by 0.9% or NOK 18 million. 22 The logarithmic relationship between Q and board size means that the estimated coefficient is the absolute change in Q per unit relative
22 If the initial stake were 1% instead of 8%, a one percentage point increase would push firm value up by 22 million instead of 18 million. This difference reflects the concave relationship between performance and insider holdings. change in board size. If board size decreases by one percent (i.e, the relative change is 0.01), Q increases by 0.002 units; i.e, from 1.558 to 1.560, which is 0.13% or 2.6 million. If, more realistically, board size is reduced by one seat rather than one percent, firm value would increase by 2% or by 40 million.
Summarizing, the full multivariate model suggests that the ownership characteristic with the strongest impact on firm value is insider holdings, where a percentage point higher stake increases firm value by 1% in the average firm. The performance effect of a corresponding growth in the other governance mechanisms is 0.8% for individuals' holdings, −0.4% for ownership concentration, and 0.8% for the fraction of voting shares. Firm value will grow by approximately 2% if board size is reduced by one member. Since equity is on average 40% of total assets, the relative impact on equity will be higher, and more so the less debt is influenced by modified governance mechanisms. If debt value is unaffected, the relative equity value effect will be 2.5 times the relative firm value effect.
Robustness of the full multivariate model
The coefficients in table 4 were estimated by OLS using all firms in all years as one sample. Disregarding simultaneity and reverse causation, which we address in section 4, there may be three other problems with this approach. Since we have used pooled cross section -time series panel data, one firm may appear numerous times in the sample (autocorrelation). Governance mechanisms may be related to each other and to the controls (multicollinearity), and a time-independent model may be misspecified if the underlying structure changes over the nine years (instability). Instability may occur if the aggregate performance effect of factors subsumed in the error term fluctuate over time, such as a market-wide revaluation of most firms due to altered risk premia or interest rates. This will influence market based performance measures such as Q, but not necessarily firm specific governance mechanisms or controls.
We use three different approaches to evaluate the robustness of our conclusions to these problems. We run year by year OLS, which have no time series correlation, and where structural shifts will show up in the time series of estimated coefficients. These regressions will suffer compared to the pooled ones due to much fewer observations (typically 100 firms per year vs roughly 900 firm-years). We therefore expect that the year by year regressions will have higher p-values, biasing the tests toward accepting the equilibrium hypothesis of marginal independence between governance and performance. To avoid the small sample problem and simultaneously address autocorrelation and instability, we use two other approaches which both utilize the pooled panel. In GMM regressions, error term dependency is picked up by the estimated standard errors and hence reflected in the p-values. We also add annual indicator variables to the pooled OLS model, such that the resulting fixed effects regression may capture certain types of instability by allowing the constant term to change over time.
[ Table 5 about here.] Table 5 shows the results of applying the three alternative regression techniques to the full multivariate model. The overall pattern from table 4 reappears, although the consistency is not perfect. First, the inverse relation between performance and concentration shows up everywhere, is highly significant in the GMM and fixed effects regressions (panel B), but is only significant at the 1% level in two of the nine years in the year by year regressions (panel A). Second, although both methods in panel B estimate the usual positive and significant (p ≤ 1%) coefficient for the linear insider term and a negative coefficient for the quadratic term, the p-value of the latter is 10% with GMM and 4% with fixed effects. Third, the coefficient of international investors becomes significantly positive with fixed effects. Finally, the fixed effects regression finds that the structural relationship changes in the two final sample years. The explanation is in the bottom row of panel A, which documents a strong market-wide upward shift in Q in these two years.
Because table 3 showed that the univariate relationships are sensitive to the choice of performance measure, table 6 re-estimates the full multivariate model with the alternative performance measures. To simplify the comparison, we repeat the findings for Q in the second column.
[ Table 6 about here.] Just as in the univariate case, consistency across performance measures is low, particularly for the market return on stock (RoS and RoS 5 .) For instance, neither concentration nor insider holdings enters significantly when performance is measured as market return on stock, whereas both the linear and the quadratic insider terms are significant (p ≤ 2.5%) in both Q, RoA 5 , and RoA. Notice also that concentration is only significant under Q. Thus, our findings on the interaction between governance and performance based on Q can not be generalized to other performance measures.
Finally, one may wonder whether the use of equity market cap as a control for size matters for the estimated relationship, since the dependent variable Q is partially determined by the same market cap. Using instead sales as the size proxy, we find that although no estimated sign is reversed for any governance mechanism, the coefficient is no longer significant at the 5% level for the quadratic insider term, individual owners, board size, and the fraction of voting shares. Moreover, the negative impact of indirect ownership through nonfinancial becomes significant at the 1% level.
Partial multivariate models
The estimates from seven partial multivariate models are reported in table 7, which also lists our estimates of the full multivariate model from table 4 as model (8) in the rightmost column. Before contrasting these findings to those of the univariate and the full multivariate models, we briefly relate (1)- (7) to the existing international evidence, which is mostly based on these models.
In their pioneering study of ownership concentration, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) (hereafter DL) relate Q to the holdings of the five largest owners in 511 large US corporations in 1980. The estimated relationship is insignificant at conventional levels, which is inconsistent with the Berle and Means (1932) hypothesis, but supportive of the equilibrium argument of Demsetz (1983) . Model (1) in table 7 shows the replication of the DL approach on our data.
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Unlike Demsetz and Lehn (1985), we find that ownership concentration and performance are significantly related. The other coefficients in the regression tally with the DL results.
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[ To capture non-monotonicity, they use a piecewise linear function with prespecified steps at 5% and 25% because this combination maximizes the R 2 . They find that performance increases with insider holdings up to 5%, decreases as the stake grows further to 25%, and increases again thereafter. Model (2) estimates the MSV model in our sample. Our results
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The controls in DL are industry dummies for utilities and financials (supposed to capture regulatory effects), investments in real assets, R&D, advertising, firm size, and stock price volatility. Because our sample contains no financials and very few utilities, we use the industry classification from table 2. Since Norwegian accounting statements do not specify R&D and advertising, these two items must be ignored. We use investment intensity (investment over sales) as a substitute proxy, and we log transform the holding of the five largest owners in order to be consistent with DL. 24 DL's assumption of a linear concentration -performance relationship was criticized by Morck et al. (1988) , stating that "...the failure of Demsetz and Lehn to find a significant relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is probably due to their use of a linear specification that does not capture an important nonmonotonicity.". To explore this empirically, we let the five largest owners' stake enter both as a linear and a quadratic term. The linear term still has a negative, significant sign, but the quadratic term is insignificant, suggesting that the simple linear specification of DL captures the essentials of the interaction between performance and concentration in our sample.
are different as the relationship is positive through the first two intervals up to 25% and negative thereafter.
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McConnell and Servaes (1990) (McS) expand the MSV approach by roughly doubling sample size, using more heterogeneous firms in terms of size, and by including two years (1976 and 1986) instead of just one (1980). They also consider outside concentration and institutional ownership, their insiders are officers and directors, and they allow for a less restrictive and more smooth relation between insider holdings and performance by using a quadratic functional form.
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Model (3) includes outside concentration, a linear and a quadratic insider term, and controls. There is a significant quadratic relationship between insiders and performance , and the negative effect of outside concentration from (1) survives.
27 Model (4) expands further by adding not just the institutional owners used by McS, but all five owner types discussed earlier. The positive, significant coefficient for individual holdings suggests that direct ownership performs better than indirect, regardless of whether the indirect stake is private or state, institutional or non-institutional.
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The multivariate regression of model (5), which includes outside concentration, quadratic insider effects, board size, and controls, supports the evidence from several other countries that performance is negatively and significantly (p ≤ 1%) related to board size. The estimates of model (6) supports the security design prediction that since Q ignores the value of private benefits, firms with dual-class shares will be less valuable than others by this measure, and more so the lower the fraction of A shares to B shares outstanding.
Since most empirical governance research has not tested for financial policy as a governance mechanism, (2)-(6) include the debt to assets ratio as a governance independent control. Since both leverage and dividend payout may act as governance mechanisms, the 25 MSV use R&D and advertising expenses to account for the impact on Q of immaterial assets. Since we lack such data, these controls must be ignored. Like MSV, we control for size and industry and include leverage to control for governance-independent performance effects of financing. Like in MSV, our p-values increase as we move upward in the insider size intervals, p being below 1%, 3%, and 7%, respectively.
26 The McS insider-performance relation has its maximum at 38% in 1986 and at 49% in 1976. 27 One may wonder if this result is caused by an overlap between concentration and insider holdings, since some of the large owners may also be insiders. However, no conclusion changes if we account for this overlap by removing the insiders from the concentration measure. Alternatively, if we include an additional insider variable for the stake of the largest insider, its estimated coefficient is significantly negative, once more suggesting that concentration per se is value destroying, also when the large owner is an insider.
28 According to Allen and Phillips (2000) , shareholdings by certain nonfinancials may still be better if it acts as a sharing mechanism for jointly produced profits or an information channel in strategic alliances. Using intercorporate ownership between OSE firms as a proxy for holdings between large firms with many owners, we find a significantly negative (p < 2%) link to performance. Thus, any positive strategic effect of intercorporate investments seems more than offset by the negative monitoring effect hypothesized by the agency model.
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evidence from model (7) does not support an agency story, as the estimated sign is negative in both cases. At conventional levels, the coefficient is significant (p ≤ 1%) for leverage and insignificant for dividend payout. Table 7 has one very striking property. Notice by reading the table horizontally that most relationships survive all the way from the simplest models on the left to the most comprehensive models on the right. Performance is always significantly (p ≤ 1%) related to ownership concentration (-), direct ownership (+), to the use of nonvoting shares (+), and to inside ownership (+) up to a certain point. The insignificant impact of state, international, and nonfinancial owner identity relative to financials occurs everywhere. In fact, these relationships also showed up in the univariate models in table 3, except that univariate models cannot reflect non-monotonicity by construction. The only discrepancy is that although performance and board size are always inversely related in the univariate case, the link is only significant in the multivariate setting (p ≤ 5%). Conversely, the significant, negative univariate performance effect of state and nonfinancial owners disappears once we control for other governance mechanisms and controls.
Our interpretation of this very persistent pattern is that the sign (but not necessarily the strength) and statistical significance of the interaction between governance and performance is quite independent of what model specification we choose within cell 1 of table 1. Because each mechanism has a separate, independent link to performance, the performance effect of a given mechanism does not have to be estimated by complex data demanding models. Our finding that the p-values persist when new variables are introduced suggests that governance mechanisms are not used as substitutes and complements. We analyze mechanism interaction more closely in the next section.
Simultaneous equation models
We have so far taken the governance mechanisms as exogenously given by not modeling their endogeneity, i.e., potential internal dependence.
29 Also, we have not analyzed causation, i.e., whether the effect runs from governance to performance, the opposite way, or both. Simultaneous equation models may in principle handle both problems and bring us from cell 1 to cell 4 in table 1. To successfully implement this approach, however, the theory to be tested must validly restrict the coefficients of the equation system before estimation starts. This section shows that because the estimates are sensitive to the choice of instruments (restrictions), and since governance theory cannot rank alternative restrictions, the simul-taneous equations approach is no panacea for analyzing the interaction between governance and performance.
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Because theory is often silent on how governance mechanisms interact, we cannot hope to validly restrict a system of equations which includes most of the governance mechanisms analyzed in section 3. Therefore, we only endogenize outside ownership concentration and insider holdings. These two mechanisms have received the widest attention in the literature, and agency theory argues that they represent alternative vehicles for reducing agency costs (external monitoring vs. internal incentives). Since there is little theoretical backing for how the two relate to the remaining mechanisms, our setup is also well suited for exploring how conclusions change as we alter the interaction assumptions by choosing alternative instruments. The problems we encounter in this limited setting of two endogenous mechanisms and two-way causation should be sufficient to illustrate what would happen if more mechanisms were endogenized.
We specify nine alternative models, each representing a particular set of instruments. The basic relationship is the full multivariate model from section 3 except that we remove the quadratic term on insider ownership. We do this to avoid econometric problems that may occur in equation systems with nonlinear endogenous variables (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, ch.18.7) . Also, the performance effects captured by the quadratic insider term in single equation estimates may now instead be found directly in an equation system which allows for linear interaction between performance, concentration, and insiders.
Model (A) uses stock volatility and board size to identify the concentration and insider equations, respectively. Thus, higher stock volatility is assumed to increase concentration, but not insider ownership, using the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) idea that higher uncertainty increases the value of outside monitoring. Board size is assumed to affect insider ownership, but not concentration, arguing that a larger board increases the number of insiders and hence the potential insider stake.
The assumed independence of volatility and insider holdings in model (A) is questionable. Higher volatility increases the risk of an undiversified insider portfolio, the value of inside information, and also the power of incentive based compensation. In fact, because the net benefit of holding insider shares may depend on total risk, Loderer and Martin (1997) assume that stock volatility and inside ownership are related. Thus, our model (B) identifies the concentration equation not by the stock's volatility, but by its liquidity, which we operationalize as equity turnover. The microstructure rationale is that because block sales create price pressure, large owners hesitate to sell out. There is also a higher chance that large owners invest strategically. Thus, a smaller fraction of the equity will be available for trading under concentrated ownership. We assume no similar effect on insider holdings, which are normally much smaller. As in model (A), board size is supposed to identify the insider equation.
Model (C) introduces a new instrument for both mechanisms. The insider instrument is debt, arguing that more debt reduces the amount required to buy a given equity fraction. Although we cannot convincingly argue why this should not apply to outside concentration as well, it may nevertheless be even more costly for insiders than for large outsiders to hold a large stake. We choose intercorporate shareholdings as the new instrument for ownership concentration, based on the evidence that when intercorporate owners have nontrivial stakes, these holdings are quite large. 31 We do not expect intercorporate investments to be correlated with insider holdings. Stock beta is used to identify Q in all three models. Asset pricing theory predicts that systematic risk influences Q through the cost of capital, but we cannot convincingly argue why this instrument is unrelated to the other endogenous variables. One possibility is the order of magnitude argument that although beta drives all three variables, it has a stronger effect on firm value than on ownership concentration and insider holdings.
We consider two other types of instruments. Models (D), (E), and (F) lag the instruments from models (A), (B), and (C) one period. Because most of these variables are persistent, the rationale for using time t-1 instruments is that they are strongly correlated with time t endogenous variables, but unrelated to time t error terms. The second type of alternative instruments, used in models (G)-(I), is lagged observations of the endogenous variables. Because these time t-1 variables are known data in the information set at t, they can be treated as constants in the time t regression. A potential problem here is that a lagged endogenous variable may be highly correlated with more time t endogenous variables than just the one it is supposed to be an instrument for.
[ Table 8 about here.]
The estimates shown in table 8 leave three major impressions.
32 First, the estimated sign of the impact of an independent variable very often differs across the nine instrument 31 Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000) show that the mean intercorporate holding is 10% while the median is 3%. This reflects an ownership structure with a few large holdings and many small ones.
32 We use 3SLS with Stata as the estimation engine.
sets. For instance, the association between Q and insider holdings is positive in (B), (E), (G), (H), and (I), but negative in (A), (C), (D), and (F). Concentration is an exception, as the inverse relation to performance and the positive association with insiders is very robust to instrument choice. Second, compared to our earlier models in tables 3 and 7, there is less significance. Still, the ability to produce significant coefficients differs a lot across models. For instance, five mechanisms in the performance equation are significant at the 5% level in (C), two mechanisms have this property in (G), and no variable is significant in (B). There is still some consistency in the sense that significant coefficients tend to have the same sign across models. The third impression is that whereas significant coefficients are very rare in the insider equation except in model (F), they are very common across the four owner types in most models in the concentration equation. Judging from the interaction coefficients, there is no substitution between concentration and insider holdings, but rather complementarity or independence. Since the insider coefficient is typically insignificant in the Q equation and Q is typically insignificant in the insider equation, we do not replicate the finding of Loderer and Martin (1997) and Cho (1998) that performance drives insider holdings and not vice versa.
Like us, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , Cho (1998) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2002) conclude that the relationship between governance and performance is considerably less significant with simultaneous equations than with single equation models. Unlike us, they do not consider different instruments, but interpret their mostly insignificant coefficients as evidence supporting the equilibrium hypothesis of Demsetz (1983). We are not convinced by this conclusion, which implicitly assumes that the system is better specified than single equation models. As illustrated by table 8, the instability of qualitative results across instruments and the reduced significance in systems may be driven by the choice of instruments. Since there is no proper theoretical basis for the instruments, we cannot conclude that system estimates are more reliable.
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Conclusion
The question of how corporate governance relates to economic performance is getting widespread attention from politicians, practitioners, and academics alike. Our paper tries to 33 Studying how takeover defense, performance, and takeover activity interact, Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) state that "... from an econometric viewpoint, the proper way to study the relationship between any two of these variables would be to set up a system of simultaneous equations.... However, specification and estimation of such a system of simultaneous equations are nontrivial." Their concern is based on the missing theory both for the functional form and the type of interaction between the variables.
improve the empirical insight into this relationship by analyzing it in a novel way. Whereas most existing research studies just one or two ownership characteristics, we add several additional governance mechanisms, such as the identity of outside owners, board characteristics, security design, and financial policy. Instead of making the standard implicit assumption that governance mechanisms are internally independent and that causation only runs from governance to performance, we expand our single equation models into simultaneous equation systems, which can handle both mechanism endogeneity and reverse causation. Whereas most existing research focuses on large US corporations, our Norwegian sample are firms which on average are much smaller, exposed to civil law rather than common law, very seldom threatened by hostile takeovers, closely rather than widely held, seldom use incentive pay, and never have more than one officer on the board. Finally, our ownership structure data are more accurate and comprehensive than what has been used so far.
Using Tobin's Q as performance measure and operationalized it as market to book, most of our findings are consistent with agency theory. Unlike outside ownership concentration, large inside owners create market value unless they are exceptionally big. Direct ownership is more beneficial than indirect, small boards produce more value than large, and firms with dual class shares destroy market value.
Most of the significant relationships survive all the way from the univariate analysis through the various partial multivariate models to the full multivariate specification, which relates performance to the most comprehensive set of governance mechanisms and controls. This finding suggests that the estimated link between governance and performance is robust to the choice of single equation models, and that governance mechanisms are seldom complements or substitutes. Thus, when analyzing the relevance of any individual governance mechanism for corporate performance, it is unnecessary to control for the others, which are often difficult to measure.
These results based on Q cannot be generalized to performance measures like book return on assets or market return on stock, which produce much fuzzier relationships. Also, many relationships change sign or become insignificant under simultaneous equation estimation. Some authors think the latter finding supports the theoretical argument that real-world governance mechanisms are optimally implemented. Our analysis suggests the alternative hypothesis that this result is due to a misspecified model driven by ad hoc instruments. Until the theory of corporate governance can capture how performance relates to a wider set of governance mechanisms instead of just to one at a time, we doubt whether simultaneous systems can offer deeper insight than single equation models into how corporate governance and economic performance interact. The table summarizes the estimated sign and significance of univariate relations between a performance measure (Q, RoA 5 , RoS 5 , RoA, and RoS) and an independent variable (governance mechanism or control). Q is the market value of the firm divided by its book value, RoA is the book return on total assets, RoS is the market return on stock, and variables subscripted with a 5 are five year averages. Statistical significance is indicated with * , * * , and * * * , which means the relationship is significant at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% level, respectively. Data for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 1989 Exchange, -1997 Pooled OLS regression using data for all listed firms on the OSE from 1989 to 1997. In regressions using equity value across years the nominal values are adjusted to the 1997 general price level. The table summarizes results from estimating the full multivariate model using five alternative performance measures. Q is the market value of the firm divided by its book value, RoA is the book return on total assets, RoS is the market return on stock, and variables subscripted with a 5 are five year averages. Statistical significance is indicated with * , * * , and * * * , which means the relationship is significant at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% level, respectively. Data for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 1989-1997. -*** Largest owner -*** Ownership concentration -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** Insiders (0 to 5) +*** Insiders (5 to 25) +** Insiders (25 to 100) -Insiders +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** Squared (Insiders) -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -** Aggregate state holdings --Aggregate international holdings + + Aggregate individual holdings +*** +*** Aggregate nonfinancial holdings --ln(Board size) -*** -* Fraction voting shares +*** +*** Debt to assets -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** Dividends to earnings --* Industrial -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -** Transport/shipping -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** Offshore -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** -*** Investments to income --ln(Equity value) +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** +*** Stock volatility -n 905 1057 1057 1057 906 1042 1028 868 R 2 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.27
The table summarizes the estimated sign and significance levels in eight different multivariate models which all use performance measured by Q (market to book) as the dependent variable. Model (1) is a pure concentration model, (2) is a pure insider model, (3) is a concentration-insider model, (4) is a concentrationinsider-owner type model, (5) is a concentration-insider-board model, (6) is a concentration-insider-security design model, (7) is a concentration-insider-financial policy model, and (8) includes every governance mechanism and control variable in the sample (full multivariate model). Data for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 1989 Exchange, -1997 The instruments for performance, ownership concentration, and insider holdings are stock beta, stock volatility, and board size in model (A), stock beta, stock turnover, and board size in model (B), and stock beta, intercorporate shareholdings, and debt to assets in model (C). Models (D)-(F) use the same instruments lagged one period, and the instruments in (G)-(I) are the endogenous variables lagged one period. A + or a − sign means the coefficient is estimated with a positive or negative coefficient, respectively. Statistical significance is indicated with * , * * , and * * * , which means the relationship is significant at the 5%, 2.5% and 1% level, respectively. Data for firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, 1989-1997.
